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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
BETWEEN SECURITIES FIRMS AND THEIR
EMPLOYEES
Alternative dispute resolution, and especially arbitration, has become an
increasingly popular route for litigation-weary (and wary) businesses in
recent years. Some courts, however, have not been willing to give up their
dominion to what they see as an inferior process with much room for bias and
manipulation. This is true even where the industry utilizing arbitration
agreements is composed of highly sophisticated employees and employers,
and thus the fear of overreaching and like practices should be at its lowest.
This Recent Development details the current conflict in the federal courts
regarding the enforceability of securities industry arbitration agreements
where an employment dispute is at issue, a conflict precipitated by the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood.1 This Recent
Development begins by examining the Federal Arbitration Act2 ("FAA") in
which Congress espoused its desire to have arbitration agreements enforced
according to their terms. This Recent Development then summarizes the
Supreme Court's attempt to fashion some general principles regarding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. Next, this Recent Development
details arbitration agreements between securities firms and their employees,
and how these agreements were treated by courts before the Seventh Circuit's
Farrand decision. This Recent Development then discusses the Farrand
decision, the reaction of the securities industry, the largely negative reception
the Farrand decision has received thus far, and cases in which courts have
found ways to avoid the conflict. To complete the story, this Recent
Development concludes with a short commentary aimed at unearthing a
moral that businesses can take from this conflict.
1. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
2. 9U.S.C.§§ 1-16(1994).
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I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1925
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act3 in 1925, obligating courts to
enforce all otherwise enforceable written arbitration agreements involving
transactions in interstate commerce,4 except for "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce."5
The FAA was not passed in order to establish arbitration as an alternative
means of dispute resolution. Rather, the purpose of the bill, evidenced by the
language of section 26 and the legislative history,7 was to insure that
otherwise enforceable agreements to arbitrate "shall be recognized and
enforced by the courts of the United States ... at this time when there is so
much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation."8
Many commentators, and even courts, assailed the FAA. It was deemed
the product of "business propagandists" by some.' Others, suggesting that the
court system is the only place where "the public.., can find protection,"'0
criticized the FAA for cutting off access to this sanctuary for those who
entered into arbitration agreements. The Georgia Supreme Court warned of
3. Ch. 213,43 Stat 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)).
4. Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
The mandate is contained in section 3, which provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
6. See supra note 4.
7. H.R REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. (1924).
8. Id. atl-2
9. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 112 (1983) (quoting Philip G. Phillips,
counsel to the National Relations Labor Board during the 1930s).
10. Id. at 113 (quoting Philip G. Phillips, CommercialArbitration Under the N.R.A., I U. CHI. L.
REv. 424,429 (1933-34)).
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this possibility twenty years before passage of the FAA: "By first making the
contract, and then declaring who should construe it, the strong could oppress
the weak, and in effect so nullify the law as to secure the enforcement of
contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy."'1 The
constitutionality of the FAA was challenged unsuccessfully as well. 2
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACTS OF 1933 AND 1934-
SECURITIES FIRMS BEGIN USING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The federal government began its regulation of securities and the
securities industry in earnest with the passage of the Securities and Exchange
Acts of 1933"s and 1934.14 These acts were in response to the stock market
crash of 1929. Due to Congress's belief that the crash occurred, at least in
part, because of a clog in the flow of relevant information, 5 the thrust of the
acts was to mandate various forms of disclosure whenever securities were
purchased and sold. 6
Although the Acts subject securities transactions to greater federal
oversight, the Acts' provisions most relevant to this discussion call for the
federal government to step back, and allow the securities industry to regulate
itself, while the federal government acts in merely a supervisory capacity.' 7
The vehicles for this self-regulation were aptly named Self-Regulatory
Organizations ("SROs"),8 and the SEC was charged with oversight
1 . Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904).
12. See, e.g., Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
13. Ch. 38,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)).
14. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994)).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) (discussing the necessity for regulation).
16. The required disclosures in the proxy solicitation process are illustrative. See 15 id. § 78n.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994).
18. Section 78s(g) details the duties of SROs:
Every self-regulatory organization shall comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and its own rules, and (subject to the provisions of section 78q(d) of this
title, paragraph (2) of this subsection, and the rules thereunder) absent reasonable justification or
excuse enforce compliance-
(A) in the case of a national securities exchange, with such provisions by its members and
persons associated with its members;
(B) in the case of a registered securities association, with such provisions and the provisions of
the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaldng Board by its members and persons associated
with its members; and
(C) in the case of a registered clearing agency, with its own rules by its participants.
Id. § 78s(g).
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responsibility.'9
SROs became the catalyst for the use of arbitration agreements in the
securities industry. The increased use of such agreements led inevitably to
litigation over their enforceability. The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the
question, and in the process set the stage for today's litigation over the
applicability of such agreements to employment disputes.
III. EARLY INTERPRETATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: THE
SUPREME COURT SETS THE STAGE.
In Wilko v. Swan,2" the plaintiff sued under the 1933 Act, claiming that a
securities broker's fraudulent misrepresentations induced him to buy
securities." The broker, relying on an arbitration provision contained in the
plaintiff's purchase contract, moved for a stay pending arbitration.22
The Court refused to compel arbitration, finding the agreement void under
a provision in the 1933 Act which prohibited any "condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision" of the Act.23 The Court brought the arbitration agreement
within this prohibition by referencing the scienter requirement of the Act and
the deference required to be given to arbitrators' decisions on that and other
elements, concluding that these two factors combined to amount to a virtual
waiver of compliance with the Act by the plaintiff, and thus voided the
agreement. 4 Although the Court noted the congressional purpose of
enforcing arbitration agreements under the FAA, it found this purpose
overridden by the protections sought to be afforded investors by the 1933
Act.25
Four years later, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 26 the Court
dealt with the "contracts of employment" exception to the FAA. 7 The Court
found that courts could require parties to arbitrate claims arising from
collective bargaining agreements, concluding that collective bargaining
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994).
20. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
21. Id. at 428-29.
22. Id. at 429.
23. Id. at 430 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77n).
24. Id. at431-34
25. Id. at 438.
26. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 74:1291
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agreements do not fall within the FAA's "contracts of employment"
exception."
The line of cases known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy"29 marked the
Supreme Court's first significant pronouncements regarding its attitude
toward the enforceability of arbitration clauses in light of the FAA. All three
cases involved suits by unions to compel arbitration of disputes between the
union and the employer," and in all three, the Supreme Court ordered
arbitration.3' Most importantly, the Court evidenced its strong intention to
construe arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration, relying on the strong
public (and, in Steelworkers I, statutory) policy in favor of allowing parties to
choose alternative methods of dispute resolution.32
28. See Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 459.
29. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. (Steelworkers 1), 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (Steelworkers I1), 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. (Steelworkers II1), 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
30. In Steelworkers I. the union filed a grievance to regain employment for a member who had
been fired. 363 U.S. at 564. In Steelworkers II, the union filed a grievance after the company had
contracted out work and subsequently laid off a number of the union's members. 363 U.S. at 577. In
Steelworkers Ill, the union filed a grievance after eleven of its members had been fired for protesting
the discharge of another union member. 363 U.S. at 595, 599. This dispute actually went to arbitration
upon order of a federal district court. Id, at 595. The arbitrator found in favor of the union, but the
employer refused to comply, bringing the case back to court, and subsequently to the Supreme Court.
Id.
31. Steelworkers !, 363 U.S. at 569; Steelworkers 11, 363 U.S. at 585; Steelworkers II, 363 U.S.
at 599.
32. In Steelworkers I, the Court stated:
Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act... states, "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement . That policy can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties for
settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play.
363 U.S. at 566 (second omission in original)
In Steelworkers 11, the Court added:
[T]o be consistent with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by the parties
through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to
the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the
arbitrator power to make the award he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor
ofcoverage.
363 U.S. at 582-83.
The Courts' final word came in Steelworkers III:
[The question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the
arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for, and so far as the arbitrator's
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Court's affinity for strict application of arbitration clauses continued
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing.33 The plaintiff in
Prima Paint claimed that he had been fraudulently induced into executing a
consulting agreement."4 The agreement, however, contained a broad
arbitration clause.35 The issue thus presented to the Court was whether the
arbitration clause was effective notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff
claimed that fraudulent inducement voided the entire contract.
The Court answered in the affirmative,36 supporting its conclusion by
referencing section 3 of the FAA.37 The Court noted that under that section, a
federal court must order arbitration of a dispute contemplated by the
arbitration clause "once it is satisfied that 'the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in
issue."' 3' Because the alleged fraudulent inducement did not relate
specifically to the arbitration clause, section 3, as well as the "congressional
purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a
contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts,"39
mandated arbitration of the dispute.4" The Court also indicated that the FAA
created a substantive law for federal courts to apply, notwithstanding contrary
state law.4"
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.42 represented an abrupt change in the
Supreme Court's attitude toward arbitration agreements. In that case, the
plaintiff filed a wrongful discharge grievance against his employer.43 The
363 U.S. at 599.
33. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
34. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant fraudulently represented that it was solvent, when in fact
it was insolvent and intended to file for bankruptcy after execution of the agreement. Id. at 398.
35. The clause, in pertinent part, provided: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration." Id. at 398.
36. Id. at 406-07.
37. See supra note 4 for text of§ 3.
38. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4) (alterations in original).
39. Id. at 404.
40. Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart dissented. They found it "fantastic" that a court would
order arbitration under a contract which itself could ultimately be found void on the basis of fraudulent
inducement Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 405. The indication became a holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
(1984), where the Court concluded that state law which "undercut[s] the enforceability of arbitration
agreements... violates the Supremacy Clause." See also Bayma v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham &
Co. 784 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 713 F.2d 370
(8th Cir. 1983); In re Mercury Constr., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981), af'd., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
42. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
43. Id. at 39.
[VCOL. 74:1291
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grievance dispute was submitted to arbitration, during which the plaintiff also
charged racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.4 The arbitrator found
in favor of the employer on the wrongful discharge grievance without
mentioning the Title VII claim,45 and the employee filed suit for the alleged
Title VII violation in federal court.46 The employer pointed to a provision in
its collective bargaining agreement which called for disputes between the
employer and any union member to be submitted to arbitration, and moved
for summary judgment.47 The motion was granted by the district court, which
found the arbitrator's findings to be binding on the employee.4" The Tenth
Circuit affied.
49
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "final responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts. ' In order to secure to
persons the chance to have federal courts exercise this authority, the court
found "it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII." Of particular importance to the Court were the
inherent deficiencies in the arbitration process:
[T]he factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable. 2
In McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan,53 the Alexander rationale was
extended to prevent enforcement of arbitration clauses in actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.54
44. Id. at 42. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-
17 (1994).
45. Alexander,415 U.S. at42.
46. Id at 43. Alexander filed suit even though the EEOC found that there was no reasonable
cause to believe Title VII was violated. Id.
47. Id. at 40 n.3, 43.
48. Id. at 43 (citing the district court's opinion at 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971)).
49. Id. (citing the Tenth Circuit's per curiam affirmance at 466 F.2d 1209 (10th. Cir. 1972)).
50. Id. at 44.
51. Id. at51.
52. Id. at 57-58.
53. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
54. See id. at 292.
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Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd"5 signaled another about-face for the
Court on the arbitrability issue. The plaintiff, an investor, filed suit against
Dean Witter alleging violations of both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and state law. 6 Dean Witter sought to compel arbitration of only the state law
claims.57 The district court denied Dean Witter's motion, 8 and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, compelling arbitration of the
state law claims, while allowing the 1934 Act claim to be litigated in court.60
In doing so, the Court made comments, the likes of which it had not made
since Steelworkers I" and Ptima Paint,62 re-affirming its commitment to
enforcing arbitration agreements: "The preeminent concern of Congress in
passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation."'
Four months later, the about-face signaled by Byrd became a sprint toward
strict enforcement of arbitration agreements. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,6'4 the parties had entered into a distributorship
agreement, agreeing that "[a]ll disputes, controversies or differences which
may arise ... out of ... this Agreement ... shall be finally settled by
arbitration in Japan.""5 The Court found the agreement applicable to Soler's
claim that Mitsubishi had violated federal antitrust laws.66
The emphatic language used by the Court in Mitsubishi was the most
profound aspect of the case, especially considering that the Court was
rejecting, without even mentioning, the its equally emphatic decisions in
Alexander67 and McDonald.68 In particular, the Court noted that unless "the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for revocation of any contract,'
55. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
56. Id. at214.
57. Id. at 215.
58. Id. at215-16.
59. Id. at 216 (citing the Ninth Circait's affirmance at 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984)).
60. Id. at 223-24.
61. See supra note 32.
62. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
63. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221.
64. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
65. Id. at 617.
66. Id. at 640.
67. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
68. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); see supra notes 53-54.
[VOL. 74:1291
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... [t]he Act itself provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims."'69 Also, responding (without citing) to cases which had
prohibited a prospective waiver of statutory rights, such as Alexander," the
Court made an important distinction:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.... Having made
the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.
71
Three years later, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,72 the
Court reafftrmed the pro-arbitration rationale espoused in Mitsubishi.73 In
finding that McMahon's 1934 Act and RICO claims were subject to
mandatory arbitration, the Court reinterpreted Wilko to mean that while the
1933 and 1934 Acts prohibited waivers of substantive rights, the prohibition
did not apply to alternative forum choices.74 Echoing Mitsubishi, the Court
found that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements, even in
relation to statutory claims, unless the court can find congressional intent to
preclude a waiver of the right to a judicial forum in the particular statute.7"
The next expression of the Court's affinity for arbitration clauses came in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.76 The Court in
Rodriguez expressly overruled Wilko, holding that in the face of a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement, neither claims under the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act
could be litigated.77
Perhaps the most pivotal case in this area was Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,78 where the Court, relying on Mitsubishi, held
that a securities dealer's Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
claim was subject to compulsory arbitration under Rule 347 of the New York
69. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2, reprinted supra note 4) (citations omitted).
70. 415 U.S. 36; see supra notes 42-52.
71. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
72. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
73. See supra notes 69 & 71 and accompanying text.
74. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-29.
75. Id. at 226-27.
76. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
77. Id. at 485.
78. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
1996] 1299
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Stock Exchange ("NYSE").79 The Court reversed the district court, which had
relied on Alexander and its progeny in finding that the congressionally
established mechanism for the adjudication of ADEA claims prevented
protected persons from waiving their rights under the statute. 0
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's claims regarding the inadequacy of
the arbitration process, and in doing so cast doubt on its prior decisions which
had expressed animosity toward the arbitration process:
Such generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complaints," and as such, they are "far out
of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes."'"
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's attacks on the adhesive and unfair
nature of the contract, referencing the FAA: "[A]rbitration agreements are
enforceable 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."'82 Although warning that "courts should remain
attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from
the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide
grounds 'for revocation of any contract,"' 83 the Court found no indication of
such behavior or such disparity in the facts of Gilmer.4
IV. INTRODUCTION TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY
The reasoning of courts in cases following Gilmer shifted from a
generalized analysis of the arbitration process to a much more particularized
analysis of the detailed process by which arbitration agreements come about
in the securities industry. For these post-Gilmer courts, that process, rather
than generalized arguments for and against the arbitration process, became
the focal point of the debate. Thus, it is necessary at this point to take a brief
detour to explain the process used by SROs to bind employees to arbitration
79. Id. at 35. The relevant text of NYSE Rule 347 is reprinted infra note 105.
80. 500 U.S. at 24,35.
81. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481) (alterations in original).
82. Id. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
83. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)).
84. Id.
[VCOL. 74:1291
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agreements.
Every firm dealing in securities requires its agents to register with an
SRO, such as the NYSE or the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"),"5 and be bound by the rules promulgated for the SRO members.
This is accomplished by having applicants sign what is technically called a
"Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer,"
commonly referred to as a "U-4.,,86 The U-4 is the equivalent of an
application for employment, with questions about employment history,
criminal convictions, and the like. 7
The interplay of the U-4 and the substantive code of an SRO, especially in
the arbitration context, can be tricky, but an understanding of this interplay is
essential to an understanding of the case law to be discussed from this point
on. Using the NASD as an example," the agreement to arbitrate is made at
the time the applicant signs a U-4. The U-4 contains a clause whereby the
applicant-employee "agree[s] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy
that may arise between me and my firm... that is required to be arbitrated
under the rules ... of the organizations with which I register."89 Thus, the U-
4 does not itself bind the employee to arbitration. Rather, the U-4 only binds
the employee to arbitrate those disputes that are required to be arbitrated by
the rules of the SRO to which the employer and employee belong.
The pertinent NASD rule in the arbitration context, the rule referenced by
the above clause in the U-4, is the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
("NASD Code" or "Code")." Before being amended in 1993, section 1 of the
NASD Code,9' provided in relevant part:
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994) (specifically includes in its definition of SROs "national
securities exchange[s]" (e.g., the NYSE) and "registered securities association[s]" (e.g., the NASD)).
Also included are "registered clearing agenc[ies]." Id.
86. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
87. See Alton v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, No C-94-0618 MI-IP, 1994 WL 443460, at *4
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 1994) (discussing contents of U-4).
88. The NASD is chosen because the ambiguity of its Code of Arbitration Procedure has
engendered the most litigation, and the present conflict. The NYSE Rules, by contrast, are much less
susceptible to specific attack, for they have always specifically included employment disputes within
the category of disputes subject to compulsory arbitration. See infra note 105.
89. Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (emphasis added),
excerpted in ANTHONY W. DJINIS & JOSEPH A. POST, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND
FORMS app. IC (1994).
90. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Code ofArbitration Procedure, in NASD Manual (CCH)
3701-46 (1993) [hereinafter NASD, 1993 Code].
91. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text
1996] 1301
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This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed ... for the
arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in
connection with the business of any member of the Association, with
the exception of disputes involving the insurance business of any
member which is also an insurance company:
(1) between or among members;
(2) between or among members and public customers, or other; and
(3) between or among members, registered clearing agencies with
which the Association has entered into an agreement to utilize the
Association's arbitration facilities and procedures, and participants,
pledgees or other persons using the facilities of a registered clearing
agency, as these terms are defined under the rules of such a registered
clearing agency.'
Section 8 of the NASD Code expressly mandated that "[a]ny dispute,
claim or controversy eligible for submission under Part I of this Code...
shall be arbitrated."'93 Thus, the arbitration agreement is accomplished by
incorporating the rules of the NASD, which require arbitration, into the U-4
application for registration.94
92. NASD, 1993 Code, supra note 90, 3701.
93. Id. 3708.
94. Plaintiffs have challenged this "bind by incorporation" method but have almost universally
failed. See, e.g., Pain, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F.2d 577, 580
(2d Cir. 1984) ("mhe arbitration provisions of the NYSE Constitution and Rules are sufficient in and
of themselves to compel arbitration."); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d
1286 (8th Cir. 1984) (Rule 347 constitutes valid agreement to arbitrate); Zdeb v. Shearson Lehman
Bros., 674 F. Supp. 812 (D. Colo. 1987) (plaintiff bound by NYSE Rule 347 even if no separate
agreement specifically stating so is signed); Manes Org. v. Standard Dyeing & Finishing Co., 472 F.
Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (arbitration agreement or clause can be effective even if not signed or
subscribed to by the parties).
Plaintiffs who brought suit after signing a U-4 but before becoming registered have also tried,
unsuccessfully, to avoid the arbitration provisions of the various SRO Codes. See, e.g., Cherry v.
Wetheim Schroder & Co., 868 F. Supp. 830, 835 (D.S.C. 1994) (Plaintiff must arbitrate pursuant to
NASD Code even though she failed to pass the NASD registration exam. "[E]xpress language of the
application put Plaintiff on notice that she was agreeing to be subject to the organizations' rules and
regulations by the mere execution of the application form."); Foley v. Presbyterian Minister Fund, Civ.
A. No. 90-1053, 1992 WL 63269, (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1992) (plaintiff bound by Code even though suit
was brought before registration became effective); Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Mgmt., 810 F.
Supp 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
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V. THE STATUS OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AFTER GILMER
Most courts took the pro-arbitration statements in Gilmer seriously and
began rigorously enforcing securities industry arbitration agreements.95
Circuit courts soon reversed holdings that had prevented enforcement of
arbitration agreements when statutory claims were involved,96 and some
circuits that did not expressly reverse themselves found that their opinions
were no longer considered binding by lower courts.97
Still, the fact that some circuits refused to disturb pre-Gilmer holdings in
refusing to enforce arbitration agreements when statutory claims were at
issue9' created (albeit through inaction) a conflict, or at least confusion,
95. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons 971 F.2d 698 (1lth Cir. 1992); Saari v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.) (plaintiff stockbroker's claim under Employee
Polygraph Protection Act subject to compulsory arbitration), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 986 (1992); Mago
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) (Title VII claim subject to mandatory
arbitration); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (Title VII claim
subject to mandatory arbitration); Kaliden v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 179, 181
(W.D. Pa. 1991) ("Because of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, and the holding in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, [defendants' motion to compel arbitration of ADEA claim
under Rule 347] shall be granted.") (citations omitted); Boogher v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 764 F.
Supp. 574, 576 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (Plaintiff stock broker's age discrimination claim was subject to
mandatory arbitration under Rule 347 of the NYSE because it "falls within the scope of the arbitration
agreement.").
96. An excellent example from the Fifth Circuit is Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 500 U.S. 930 (1991). The district court denied defendants' motion
to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII suit and to compel arbitration. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
712 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1989). On the first appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed, relying
on Aleander, 905 F.2d at 106-07. Dean Witter appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the
Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded in light of its holding in Gilmer. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Alford, 500 U.S. 930 (1991). On remand the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court. Afford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991). Noting the similarities between the ADEA (which
was the claim the Supreme Court found to be arbitrable in Gilmer) and Title VII, the court had "little
trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration." Id. at 230. The
court further noted, "Any broad public policy arguments against such a conclusion were necessarily
rejected by Gilmer," when the Supreme Court "rejected Alexander's 'mistrust of the arbitral process."'
Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,231 (1987)).
The Sixth Circuit also reversed its position. See Willis, 948 F.2d 305.
97. See Kaliden, 789 F. Supp. at 182 (finding that Gilmer "effectively reverses" the Third
Circuit's decision in Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989), which held that ADEA
claims are not subject to compulsory arbitration). Also, the decision in Boogher, 764 F. Supp. 574,
ignored the Eighth Circuit's decision in Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989), where the court held that Title VII claims were not
subject to mandatory arbitration.
98. See Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1045 (1990) (stating that "the Court has done nothing to disturb its prior ruling in Alexander that
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among the circuits as to the application of arbitration agreements to statutory
claims in the wake of Gilmer.
VI. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NASD CODE
TO EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
A. Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood-Pre-Amendment NASD Code
In Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,99 the Seventh Circuit took the split
among the circuits over the applicability of securities industry arbitration
agreements to statutory claims one step further by holding that the NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedure does not apply to employment disputes of any
sort. Farrand, a stockbroker, signed a U-4 agreement with Lutheran
Brotherhood, a financial company registered with the NASD, and thus bound
himself to the NASD Code.' ° When Farrand sued, alleging violation of the
ADEA,'0 ' Lutheran Brotherhood sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the
NASD Code.'02 The district court dismissed Farrand's suit, relying on
Gilmer. °3 The Seventh Circuit reversed.'
4
The Seventh Circuit began by noting the differences between the NYSE
Code, which explicitly required arbitration of employment disputes,0 5 and the
NASD Code, which did not expressly refer to employment disputes.0 6
Lutheran Brotherhood argued that the absence was of no moment, as the
language of the NASD Code covered "any dispute, claim of controversy
arising out of or in connection with the business of any member,"'0 7 and thus
covered employment disputes.' 8
arbitration agreements do not preclude an independent right of access to a judicial forum for resolution
of Title VII claims"); Nicholson, 877 F.2d 221 (although not followed by at least one lower court, see
supra note 97, the decision has not been expressly overruled); Swenson, 858 F.2d 1304 (although the
decision has been ignored, see supra note 97, it has not been overruled).
99. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 1254.
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (1994).
102. Farrand, 993 F.2d at 1254.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1255
105. Id. at 1254. Rule 347 of the NYSE provides for the arbitration of"[a]ny controversy between
a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or
termination of employment of such registered representative." Rule 347, 2 N.Y. Stock Exchange Guide
(CCI-) 2347 (March 1995).
106. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
107. NASD, 1993 Code, supra note 90, 3701 (emphasis added).
108. Farrand, 993 F.2d at 1254.
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The court disagreed, emphasizing the listing of parties at the end of
section 1 of part I of the NASD Code."°9 The court reasoned that the list of
parties in that section "establishes which matters are arbitrable.""' Under this
reasoning only disputes which fall within the three categories listed at the end
of section 1 would be arbitrable.
Lutheran Brotherhood, tailoring its argument to the court's reading of the
NASD Code, suggested that employees were "others" under section 1(2).1
The court rejected this argument, although it admitted that including
employees among the "others" "would not exceed the bounds of reason.
'12
In the court's mind, such a huge catch-all would make the explicit list of
parties useless,' and in the absence of an interpretive "paper trail," the court
could not subscribe to this proposition." 4
The court concluded that "§ 1 of the NASD's Code does not authorize,
and § 8 therefore does not require, the arbitration of an employment dispute
between a member of the NASD and one of the member's registered
representatives."' 15
B. NASD Responds to Contrary Decisions by Amending the NASD Code
In December of 1992, responding to the litigation over the applicability of
the NASD Code to employment disputes," 6 the NASD proposed to amend its
Code to expressly cover such disputes." 7 The SEC approved the amendment
on August 25, 1993, setting the effective date of the amendment as October 1,
1993." s The Code, as amended, required the "arbitration of any dispute,
109. Id. at 1254-55.
110. Id.at 1254.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1255.
113. Id. The court remarked, "What is the point of writing down a list of parties, only to sweep
everything off the table with a comprehensive 'or others'?" Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Although the Farrand decision was the first circuit court decision to hold that the NASD
Code does not compel arbitration of any employment disputes, it was not the first court to so hold. In
fact, the NASD, in its SEC filings accompanying its proposed amendment of the Code, stated that the
amendment was precipitated by the decision of a California court in Higgins v. Superior Court of L.A.
County, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1464 (Oct. 8, 1991), review denied and decision ordered not officially
published, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57 (1992). 58 Fed. Reg. 45,932, 45,932-33 (1993). The Farrand decision,
however, being from a federal circuit court, brought increased attention to the issue.
117. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070 (1993). The amendment sought to make the language of the NASD
Code parallel the Code of the NYSE, contained in note 105, supra.
118. 58 Fed. Reg. 45,932-33 (1993). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1994), the SEC must
19961 1305
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claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any
member of [the NASD] or arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of associated person(s) with any member... 9 In an attempt to
launch the first volley in the debate that would inevitably ensue, the NASD
emphasized that its amendment was made solely for the purpose of
clarification, and that no substantive change was being made in the NASD
Code. 20
For employment disputes in which the employee signed his U-4 after
October 1, 1993, the applicability of the NASD Code (save ordinary contract
and other statutory defenses, discussed more fully below) is virtually
unquestioned.'2 ' However, where employment disputes arise involving
approve all amendments to an SRO's rules and regulations.
119. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070, reprinted in National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Code of Arbitration
Procedure, in NASD Manual (CCII), Rules 10100-10406 (May 1996). While the amendment did clear
up the issue of whether the Code, after October 1993, applied to employment disputes, it still must be
proven, under both the NASD and NYSE Codes, that the dispute was one "arising out of' employment
or termination. If a plaintiff is suing under Title VII, the ADEA, or any other statute prohibiting
discrimination in employment or termination, the answer is clear. However, when a plaintiff's claim
has a more tangential relationship to his employment, courts have been called upon to interpret the
scope of the phrase "arising out of' employment.
The Second Circuit, in the first circuit court case construing the "arising out of employment"
clause, opted for a strict temporal test. Coudert v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, 705 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1983). The court concluded that allegations of employer's tortious conduct which occurred after
termination did not relate to employment and were thus not arbitrable. Id. at 82.
One year later, the Eighth Circuit adopted a more flexible test, which has become the
overwhelming majority rule. In Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163 (8th
Cir. 1984), the plaintiff's tort claim arose from statements made after his termination. The court, in
concluding that the claim did "arise out of' employment for purposes of NYSE Rule 347, held that
claims "arise out of' employment if they "involve significant aspects of the employment relationship."
Id. at 1167. The Morgan rule was subsequently adopted by the Second Circuit in Fleck v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 891 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit in Aspero v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc.,
768 F.2d 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985), the Ninth Circuit in Zolezzi v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), and the New York Court of Appeals in Flanagan
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 345 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 931 (1986). But see Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Ness, 677 F. Supp. 866 (D.S.C. 1988) (Plaintiffs claims for false arrest and
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, defamation, and abuse of
process did not implicate plaintiffs customers, any securities agencies, or any significant issue of
plaintiff's performance qua broker, and thus were not arbitrable under either Morgan or Coudert);
Feinberg v. Oppenheimer & Co., 658 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (using the Coudert temporal rule,
but in a less strict fashion: "The crucial question in Coudert was the relationship of the alleged
defamation to the employment agreement between the parties.").
120. 58 Fed. Reg. 45,932 (1993) ("[T]he NASD is proposing to amend Section 1 to clarify that
disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of the employment or termination of employment of an
associated person are eligible for submission to arbitration." (emphasis added)).
121. There are very few reported cases involving post-amendment signings. The primary reason is
probably that the amendment did exactly what the NASD hoped-remove any doubt as to whether the
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employees who have not expressly agreed to the amended NASD Code, the
question arises: Was the 1993 amendment merely a clarification, as the
NASD contends, or was it a substantive change in the type of disputes
covered?
Notwithstanding the NASD's attempt to characterize its amendment as
merely a clarification, the Seventh Circuit has stood by its holding in
Farrand. In Kresock v. Bankers Trust Co., the court found that Kresock
was not compelled to arbitrate her Title VII suit." 3 The suit was filed in 1992,
before the amendments to the Code.124 Relying on Farrand, the court
concluded that the "[pre-amendment] Code did not require arbitration of
employment discrimination suits. 1 25 Bankers argued that Kresock agreed to
be bound by the Code as it may be amended, and the court agreed.
1 26
However, the court noted that Kresock's suit was filed before the amendment
and, refusing to give retroactive effect to the 1993 amendment, held that the
question of arbitrability was to be determined with reference to the Code as it
stood in 1992.127 Given these facts, the court viewed Farrand as
controlling.'28
C. The Eleventh Circuit Disagrees with Farrand in Kidd v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States
In Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,'29 the
amended Code applies to employment disputes. For an example of a court recognizing this, see
Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995). See also infra notes 157-59 and
accompanying text.
122. 21 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1994).
123. Ms. Kresock alleged gender and pregnancy discrimination. Id. at 177.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 178 (citing Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). In the court's eyes, the
amendment to the Code in 1993 was "more than mere clarification[]." Id. Rather it reflected a
"'structural changeU ... that swe[pt] into the realm of arbitration a whole new class of disputes." Id. at
178-79.
126. Id. at 179.
127. Id.
128. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Farrand once again in Turner v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., No.
94-1263, 37 F.3d 1501, 1994 WL 580186 (7th Cir. Oct. 21, 1994) (unpublished decision, reversal
noted). The court rejected the defendant's argument that Farrand should be overruled in light of
Gilmer. "While noting at least one other circuit has disagreed with our position [Kidd v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 32 F.3d 516 (11 th Cir. 1994)], this court declines appellee's invitation. The Farrand
court specifically addressed Gilmer, both as to the facts the Supreme Court was presented and the legal
rules the Court established." Id. at *2.
129. 32 F.3d 516 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
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Eleventh Circuit rejected the Farrand court's analysis. In that case, Kidd had
signed a U-4 application. Upon his termination, Kidd filed an action claiming
race-discrimination, in violation of both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.13
Equitable moved to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration, but the
district court denied the motion.' Equitable appealed, and during the interim
the NASD amendment took effect.
132
The Eleventh Circuit did not need to rely on the amended Code to compel
arbitration. Declining to follow Farrand, the court read the list of parties in
section one of part I as modifying only the insurance clause.' Thus, except
for the insurance exception, the court read the NASD Code as requiring
arbitration of "any dispute connected to an [sic] NASD member's
business." 13
4
The court noted that its decision comported with the pro-arbitration
statements made by the Supreme Court and other circuits.3 5 The court also
noted that its reading of pre-amendment section 1 eliminated a conflict
created by the Farrand court. The court recognized that pre-amendment
section 8 requires employees, as "person's associated with members," to
arbitrate disputes with their employers. The court noted that interpreting
section 1 as not covering employee-employer disputes, as in Farrand, renders
the mandate in section 8 useless. 36 By contrast, interpreting section 1 to cover
employee-employer disputes maintains the full effect of section 8."'
130. Id. at 518.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 519.
134. Id. The court rejected Kidd's arguments of adhesion, waiver by Equitable, and inadequacy of
arbitration process. Id. at 518 n.4.
135. Id. at 519. The court first quoted from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983):
[Questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration. ... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of a contract [or some other question].
Kidd, 32 F.3d at 519 (alterations in original).
The court then quoted from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d
166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979):
[U]nless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue, then a stay pending arbitration should be
granted.
Kidd, 32 F.3d at 519 (alterations in original).
136. Kidd, 32 F.2d at 519.
137. Id.
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Finally, the court criticized Farrand for refusing to follow the pro-
arbitration dictates of the Supreme Court and others, and adopt a pro-
arbitration construction, 3 ' which the Farrand court itself found to be
reasonable.'39
VII. AFTER THE SPLIT-WHERE ARE WE Now?. WHERE ARE WE GOING?
A. Ninth Circuit Siding with Farrand
The Ninth Circuit has, at least in dictum, indicated its approval of the
Farrand court's holding that the pre-amendment NASD Code did not cover
employment disputes. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,' the
Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII plaintiff did not have to arbitrate her claim
against her employer. 4' The court emphasized that a waiver of the right to
pursue a claim in court through an arbitration agreement must have been
made voluntarily and knowingly to be enforceable. 4 ' The court found that
Lai did not, and indeed could not, have the requisite knowledge. Noting that
there was a dispute as to whether Lai knew the nature of the U-4 agreement,
the court concluded that the dispute was immaterial. 43 Even if Lai was aware
that by signing the U-4 she would be bound by the NASD Code, this
knowledge would not be sufficient to compel arbitration.'" Indeed, even if
Lai had signed an agreement containing the actual NASD Code language, she
would not be forced to arbitrate, because "[t]hat provision did not even refer
to employment disputes."'45 Although cautioning that its decision did not rest
on the precise language of the U-4 (and, by incorporation, the NASD Code),
the court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Farrand that the pre-
amendment NASD Code did not, as a matter of law, compel arbitration of
employment disputes."4
138. Id. at 519 n.6. For the text of those dictates, see supra note 135.
139. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
140. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
141. Id. at 1305.
142. Id. at 1304-05.
143. Id. at 1305.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
1996] 1309
Washington University Open Scholarship
1310 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
B. Courts Siding With Kidd
In O'Donnell v. First Investors Corp.,147 the plaintiff had signed his only
U-4 before the 1993 amendment."' Thus, when the defendant moved to
compel arbitration of O'Donnell's breach of employment contract and breach
of the duty of good faith claims, the court was squarely presented with
deciding "whether the October 1993 amendment to NASD rules was a
change or a clarification."' 4 9 The court noted the split among the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits, and also noted that the Second Circuit had not ruled on the
issue.S°
The O'Donnell court sided with Kidd, finding the reading in Kidd
preferable for two reasons: (1) the reading in Kidd "makes more sense given
the liberal federal policy towards arbitration," a policy that the Farrand
decision "glosses over;"'' and (2) the NASD has interpreted its Code to
apply to employment disputes as early as 1987.112
The court in F.N. Wolf& Co. v. Bowles... also sided with the analysis in
Kidd. The court stated directly that "Farrand was incorrectly decided and...
the [NASD] Code as it existed in 1990 provided for arbitration of this
[employment] dispute."'154
A like conclusion was reached in Strappes Group v. Siedle,' in similarly
blunt terms. The court found the reasoning of Farrand to be "of highly
questionable validity and should not be followed."'5 6
147. 872 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
148. Id. at 1275.
149. Id. at 1277.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1278.
152. Id. (citing F.N. Wolf& Co. v. Bowles, 610 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994)).
153. 610 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
154. Id. at 759. The Bowles court relied on a NASD statement made in its SEC filings regarding
an earlier amendment to the NASD Code. Id. This amendment prohibited registered representatives
from waiving their rights to arbitration. In its reasons for prohibiting such waivers, the NASD
expressed its dissatisfaction with a New Jersey state court which found the arbitration clause in the
NASD Code to be optional. The NASD stated that adoption of such reasoning by other courts could
have the effect of denying brokers and dealers the opportunity to arbitrate employment disputes, which
would be contrary to the NASD Code. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9232 (1987).
155. No. CV 93-11385-K, 1993 WL 443926 (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 1993).
156. Id. at *4.
The Tenth Circuit decided Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482
(10th Cir. 1994), a little less than three months after the Kidd decision. Although the court did not cite
either Farrand or Kidd, the position taken by the court comports with Kidd. In holding that a
stockbroker's Title VII claim was subject to arbitration, the court concluded, "Our reading of Gilmer,
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C. Notable Decisions Avoiding the Conflict
In Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc.' 7 the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged the circuit split over the application of the pre-amendment
NASD Code to employment disputes,' 8 but refused to take sides. Instead, the
court relied on the fact that Williams had signed a second U-4 after the
NASD Code was amended, and thus explicitly agreed to the arbitration of
employment disputes.'59
In Scher v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,16° a New York district court
was also able to avoid the issue of whether the pre-amendment NASD Code
covered employment disputes by focusing on language in the U-4 which
required employers and employees to abide by any amendments made to the
Code.
Scher was fired before the 1993 amendment to the NASD Code. 6' He
brought a Title VII action against Equitable in 1994, after the NASD Code
was amended, alleging religious discrimination.'62 Although the table was set
for the court to join the Farrand-Kidd dispute, it cleverly avoided the issue.
The court noted that by signing his U-4, Scher agreed to comply with the
and the inferences that, in light of Gilmer's reasoning, can be drawn from the Court's vacating and
remanding Alford, support the conclusion that Title VII claims are subject to compulsory arbitration."
Id. at 1487. The case is given only footnote attention here because it failed to expressly pick a side in
the FarrandlKidd dispute.
While the Supreme Court has not yet specifically resolved this conflict, the position of Justice
Ginsburg is easily predicted. In Association of Investment Brokers v. SEC, 676 F.2d 857, 861 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), then Judge Ginsburg, in dicta, noted that "NYSE and NASD rules mandate arbitration of
employer-employee disputes, and did so, to the same extent as they do now, before the development of
a uniform form under SEC auspices."
157. 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 659 n.2.
159. Id. at 659. Williams first signed a U-4 application in 1987, then signed a second U-4 in
October of 1993 (the same month the NASD Code amendment took effect). Id. at 658-59. The court
refused to exempt Williams under section 1 of the FAA, concluding that, whether or not Williams was
engaged in interstate commerce, the agreement to arbitrate was contained in his U-4 application, not
his contract for employment. Id at 660. The court also rejected the argument that Williams did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a judicial forum, which Williams claimed was required
under the ADEA. Id. at 659. The court found no indication that Congress intended the ADEA to cover
agreements to arbitrate employment disputes and, citing Mitsubishi, noted that Williams did not, by
signing the arbitration agreement, waive any substantive rights, but rather only waived the right to
have his case decided in a judicial forum. Id. at 661; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
160. 866 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
161. Id.at777.
162. Id. Scher's complaint began as a class action, but was amended to drop the class action
allegations. Id. at 777-78.
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NASD rules "as they are and may be adopted, changed or amended from time
to time."' 63 Thus, "[t]he arbitrability of the instant matter is not affected by the
nature of plaintiff's claims," and "[n]or is it relevant that Scher's employment
... terminated prior to the 1993 amendment," because Scher's signing of the
U-4 bound him to "comply with the NASD Code as it existed at the time he
commenced this action."'"
D. The Future and the Moral of the Story
Farrand has never expressly been followed by any other circuit court, and
for good reason. Its holding was shockingly broad and, as the Kidd court and
others have pointed out, rested on a strained reading of the NASD Code.'65
Thankfully, the life-span of Farrand has been curtailed by the recent
amendments to the NASD Code. Still, the decision hints at a deeper problem:
courts can still, in the ambivalence of the Supreme Court's early decisions on
the arbitration issue, find support for ignoring contracts entered into freely.
The problem, however, goes deeper than merely ignoring contract
provisions. We must remember who the parties to these contracts are-
securities firms and their employees, usually brokers. The employees
163. Id. at 778 (quoting the U-4).
164. Id. at 778. And, as discussed supra notes 116-19, the NASD Code in 1994 expressly
provided for the arbitration of employment disputes. The approach of the Scher court, enforcing the
Code as it exists at the time of suit, has become increasingly popular. See, e.g., Kurschus v. Paine
Webber, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1652 (PKL), 1996 WL 39326 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1996) (although U-4 was
signed in 1991, court applies amended NASD Code without even mentioning the amendment); Pitter
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F. Supp. 130, 134 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (the court noting that
because plaintiff's suit was filed after the NASD amended its Code, and thus "the filing of Pitter's
lawsuit differs from the scenarios presented in both Kidd and Kresock, this court need not discuss the
logical underpinning of their holdings." However, for the same reason, "it is entirely appropriate to
hold Pitter to compliance with non-substantive rules that took effect almost six months before he filed
suit."); Wojcik v. Aetna Life Ins. & Annuity, 901 F. Supp. 1282, 1288-89 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (concluding
that "[s]ince Wojcik filed his claim after the effective date of the amendment, the amendment is
applicable to Wojcik's case without retroactive application" and noting that "[t]his holding does not
contravene Kresock since in that case the claim was filed before the amendment"); Hall v. Metlife
Resources, No. 94 Civ. 0358 (JFK), 1995 WL 258061, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995) (disagreeing with
Lai, and noting that "[c]ourts in this Circuit have held that it is the NASD Code in existence at the time
an action is commenced that governs ... [for] innumerable reasons"); Moore v. Interacciones Global,
Inc., No. 94 Civ. 4789 (RWS), 1995 WL 33650, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1995) (Court distinguished
cases in which plaintiffs had "agreed to abide by the Code and not to the Code as 'amended from time
to time."' The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the NASD was attempting to apply its Code
retroactively, "[b]ecause this case was filed nine months after the amendments' effective date and
because.., the amendments did not change the substantive rights of the parties.").
165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
involved here are not teenagers, fresh out of school and desperate for jobs.
Nor are they blue-collar workers, who, while not fresh out of school, are still
not adept at negotiating contract provisions. Quite the contrary, the
employees here involved are, for the most part, highly educated and highly
trained securities brokers. Several courts have recognized this, and have noted
that the basic contract doctrine holding parties to a contract to knowledge of
its terms is very well justified when the parties are sophisticated
businesspersons.' 66
The moral of this story is not particularly esoteric. It is simply that courts
are like most everyone else-they have a job to do, and do not like others
interfering with the performance of their job. Businesses must realize this, and
draft arbitration agreements with the utmost precision, so that even courts that
do not wish to relinquish their authority will nonetheless have to.
Drew F. Davis
166. See, e.g., Gold v. SEC, 48 F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Registered brokers and associates
are presumed as a matter of law to have knowledge of the published rules of the securities exchange.");
Carter v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); see also Sloan v. NYSE, 489 F.2d 1, 3 (2d
Cir. 1973) ("[W]hen appellants became members of the [NYSE] they consented, quite knowingly and
intelligently to [its] disciplinary procedures .... ).
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